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Despite  two  decades  of  rapid  growth,  indigenous  Chileans  are  disproportionately  poor.  
However, income data obtained from non-representative surveys yield imprecise estimates of 
poverty and inequality.  This paper therefore estimates poverty and inequality using poverty 
mapping  methods.    In  contrast  to  previous  studies,  however,  we  use  ethnicity  rather  than 
geography as a basis for disaggregation.  We find that indigenous Chileans are significantly 
poorer  than  non-indigenous  people,  but  that  inequality  rates  are  also  lower  for  indigenous 
groups.    These  reliable  estimates  of  poverty  and  inequality  may  augment  the  antipoverty 
targeting criteria used in Chile, helping policy-makers to better identify poor households. 
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Poverty and Inequality among Ethnic Groups in Chile 
 
1. Introduction 
The  United  Nations  International  Decade  of  the  World’s  Indigenous  Peoples  (1994-2004) 
advanced political representation and visibility for indigenous groups in Latin America, but only 
modest gains were made in the fight against poverty.  World Bank (2005) reports that poverty 
rates for indigenous groups have remained largely unchanged, even in those countries that have 
experienced substantial growth and despite improvements in access to education and health care.  
Indeed, the indigenous population in countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, 
and Peru faces poverty rates between 13% and 30% higher than those corresponding to the non-
indigenous population, a pattern that has remained remarkably stable over the last decade (World 
Bank 2005).  The low responsiveness of indigenous poverty rates to macroeconomic business 
cycles suggests that more research is needed in order to develop a clear understanding of the 
distribution and causes of poverty for these groups.  
In Chile, where two decades of economic growth have resulted in strong reductions in 
overall poverty levels,
1 indigenous peoples continue to be disproportionately poor.  For example, 
Valenzuela (2003) reports that 32.3% of the indigenous population lived in poverty in 2000, 
compared to 20.1% of the non-indigenous population.  On average, indigenous families in Chile 
are reported to earn less than half the income of non-indigenous families, and 65% of indigenous 
people rank in the lowest two quintiles of the income distribution (World Bank 2002). 
However,  virtually  all  such  figures  are  obtained  from  the  Caracterización 
Socioeconómica  Nacional  (CASEN),  a  periodic  survey  undertaken  by  Chile’s  Ministry  of 
Planning  (MIDEPLAN).    While  the  CASEN  is  broadly  representative  at  the  national  and   3 
regional levels and  for urban residents  and rural residents as a whole,  it does not include a 
representative  sample  for  each  of  the  eight  indigenous  groups  recognized  by  Chilean  law.  
Moreover, some remote areas in which indigenous groups comprise significant shares of the 
population are not surveyed at all.  Estimates of poverty for indigenous groups obtained directly 
from the CASEN are thus imprecise.  To illustrate this point, Table 1 presents 95% confidence 
intervals for headcount ratios for each ethnic group.  Given that magnitudes of the standard 
errors (which are as large as 65 percentage points and which sometimes include negative values), 
estimates of poverty would be unreliable even if the survey were representative by ethnicity.  
Moreover,  the  large  standard  errors  for  some  indigenous  groups  make  meaningful  inference 
across ethnicities difficult.  
This paper seeks to provide reliable estimates of poverty and inequality for each ethnic 
group in Chile by making use of recent advances in poverty mapping techniques.  Specifically, 
we  combine  income  data  from  the  CASEN  survey  with  demographic  and  household  data 
available in the national census in order to derive statistically-reliable estimates of poverty and 
inequality.  This method was developed by Hentschel et al. (1999) and Elbers, Lanjouw, and 
Lanjouw (2003), and has been used extensively in the recent literature to develop poverty maps 
based on geography for developing countries.  For example, Demombynes and Özler (2005) use 
such techniques to estimate poverty at low levels of aggregation in South Africa, and Elbers et al. 
(2007) do the same for Mozambique, Madagascar, Ecuador, and Cambodia.  Agostini and Brown 
(2007) and Agostini, Brown, and Gongora (2008) use poverty maps to produce estimates of 
income inequality and poverty, respectively, at the county level in Chile, below the level of 
aggregation for which the CASEN is representative.  In contrast to any previous study, however, 
the present paper uses ethnicity rather than geography as a basis for disaggregation; that is, rather   4 
than  calculating  poverty  and  inequality  for  geographic  areas  for  which  survey  data  are  not 
representative, we do so for ethnic groups for which survey data are not representative, providing 
the first statistically precise estimates of poverty and inequality by ethnicity in Chile.   
Indigenous peoples in Chile have a long history of economic disenfranchisement, such 
that their prevalence among the poor is three times their representation in the population.  Data 
from the 2002 census show that the unemployment rate for people self-identified as belonging to 
indigenous groups was two-thirds higher than for non-indigenous Chileans (MIDEPLAN, 2004).  
In  addition,  ethnic  minorities  have  less  access  to  infrastructure  that  complements  local 
development  (World  Bank,  2002),  suggesting  that  poverty  traps  may  arise  for  some  groups, 
contributing to the persistence of inequality.
2  Therefore, developing reliable estimates of poverty 
and inequality by ethnicity would likely augment the targeting criteria currently used for Chile’s 
antipoverty programs, helping policy-makers to better identify poor households (Bigman and 
Fofack, 2000).  
Our results show that members of indigenous groups are poorer on average than the non-
indigenous population.  Specifically, the Mapuche and the Aymará have the highest incidence of 
both poverty and indigence while the non-indigenous population has the lowest rates of poverty 
and indigence.  Moreover, the Mapuche have the lowest Gini coefficient among all of Chile’s 
ethnic groups, suggesting that they are comparatively equal in their poverty.  We further find that 
while most of the inequality at the national level is derived from within-group inequality (due in 
part to the small populations of some indigenous groups), income disparity between Chile’s 
ethnic groups is nevertheless among the highest in Latin America.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the socio-
economic conditions of Chile’s indigenous population; Section 3 provides a brief overview of   5 
poverty mapping methods as applied to ethnicity; Section 4 describes the survey and census data 
employed for the purposes of this study; Section 5 provides the analysis of the results and is 
divided into two parts, the first looking at poverty and indigence rates and the second looking at 
inequality; and Section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Background: An Overview of the Issues Affecting Chile’s Indigenous Population 
Eight indigenous groups are recognized in Chile, representing about 700,000 people, or 4.6% of 
the total population in the 2002 Census.
3  However, only the Mapuche (who comprise over 95% 
of the total indigenous population), the Aymará, and the Atacameño represent more than one 
percent  of  Chile’s  total  population  (Table  2 shows  the  distribution  of Chile’s population  by 
household).  Collectively, the Quechua, Rapanui, Colla, Kawashkar, and Yagán comprise about 
0.14% of the total population, and the Kawashar and Yagán peoples are officially recognized as 
being in “danger of extinction” by the Chilean government, which has vowed to adopt measures 
preventing further population decline (Gobierno de Chile 2004).  Indigenous people constitute 
more  than  20%  of  the  population  only  in  Regions  I  and  IX,  which  represent  portions  the 
ancestral  homes  of  the  Aymarás  and  Mapuches,  respectively.
4      With  the  exception  of  the 
Mapuche (40% of whom live in rural areas), more than 75% of each indigenous ethnic group 
reside in urban areas.   
  Indigenous  communities  in  Chile  represent  a  wide  array  of  cultures,  traditional 
livelihoods,  and  sets  of  economic  opportunities.    For  example,  the  Mapuche,  Atacameño, 
Kawashar, and Yagán were traditionally hunter-gatherer societies while the Aymará, Rapanui, 
Quechua, and Colla were pastoralists.  Today, many Aymarás, Atacameños, and Quechuas are 
engaged in mining copper, gold, saltpeter, and other minerals in resource-rich northern Chile.    6 
Many Colla continue to earn their livelihoods by raising animals while many Mapuches now 
farm, work in rural industries, or work in the informal urban sector.  Most Rapanuis (whose 
ancestral home is Easter Island) are now employed in the fishing and tourism industries, as are 
many Kawashar and Yagán (concentrated in Chile’s southern extremities).   
  Due to both population growth and legislation allowing for the sub-division of indigenous 
territory into individual salable plots, land pressures have become increasingly acute.  By the 
1970s,  for  example,  Mapuche  communities  had  lost  about  250,000  hectares  from  the  areas 
initially designated as reservations.  In per capita terms, this translates into a reduction from 
about 6.1 hectares per person in 1884 to less than 0.8 hectares per person by 1980 (Gacitúa 
1992).  These pressures have encouraged labor migration, which is now common among Chile’s 
indigenous groups (World Bank 2002). 
  As  noted  in  Table  1,  survey  evidence  suggests  that  poverty  rates  are  higher  among 
indigenous groups than the non-indigenous population, a situation which is often attributed to the 
human capital profiles of ethnic minorities.  For example, educational attainment among working 
adults in the indigenous population averages 7.3 years compared to 9.5 years for non-indigenous 
working adults (World Bank 2002).  The educational status of the rural Mapuche is especially 
low, with 80% of the household heads having less than 4 years of schooling and less than 3% of 
the total population having any type of educational training beyond high school (World Bank 
2002).    Moreover,  indigenous  children  fare  poorly  in  school,  testing  at  0.3  –  0.5  standard 
deviations below the test scores of non-indigenous children (McEwan 2004).   
In terms of health status, infant mortality is generally higher among indigenous peoples 
(World  Bank  2002),  as  is  the  incidence  of  childhood  diarrhea,  tuberculosis,  and  parasitosis 
(Amigo et al. 1997).  Such discrepancies likely result from poor access to medical services as   7 
well as to differences in income.  Because better opportunities for education and health care exist 
in  urban  Chile,  off-farm  employment  and  out-migration  have  become  core  components  of 
poverty-alleviation strategies (World Bank 2002).   
In  addition,  the  National  Corporation  for  Indigenous  Development  (CONADI)  was 
tasked with addressing indigenous poverty through land reform and infrastructure development 
projects beginning in 1993.  By 2002, over 275,000 hectares of land had been purchased and 
transferred  to  indigenous  people  (World  Bank  2002).    Despite  these  initiatives,  indigenous 
groups have reportedly remained dissatisfied with the limited amount of government funding 
channeled through CONADI (Gobierno de Chile 2004).  In response to these developments and 
increasingly  virulent  protests,  President  Bachelet  recently  launched  a  “Social  Pact  for 
Multiculturalism,” which aims to overhaul economic development projects in indigenous areas 
and to redress gaps Chile’s stagnant income inequality (Malinowski 2008).  
 
3. Methodology 
Because most detailed income data are derived from surveys that are rarely representative at low 
levels  of  disaggregation  (including  disaggregation  by  ethnicity),  we  use  poverty  mapping 
methods proposed by Hentschel et al. (1999) and Elbers et al. (2003) to take advantage of the 
income  data in  household  surveys  and  the  universal  coverage of  censuses.    First,  a detailed 
household survey is used to estimate the joint distribution of household income and a vector of 
explanatory  variables.    Restricting  the  set  of  explanatory  variables  to  those  available  in  the 
census, these “first stage” estimates are used to generate the distribution of income for each 
ethnicity  represented  in  the  population,  conditioning  on  the  observed  characteristics  of  that 
subgroup.    Finally,  bootstrapping  is  used  to  simulate  values  of  household  income,  and  the   8 
complete set of simulated values is then used to calculate the headcount ratio and poverty gap 
measures of poverty and the Gini coefficient for each ethnicity represented in the population.  A 
more detailed explanation of the methodology is provided in the Appendix 1, but refer to Elbers 
et al. (2003) for complete details.  PovMap2, a software package developed by Qinghua Zhao of 
the  World  Bank  Development  Research  Group,  is  employed  to  estimate  income  as  well  as 
poverty and inequality statistics. 
It is important to mention that an important assumption underlying the poverty mapping 
method is that the model estimated using the survey data is also applicable to the Census data, a 
reasonable assumption if both data sets were generated at approximately the same time.  In our 
case, the survey was conducted in October 2003 and the census in April 2002, so we think that 
this condition is met. 
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
The  survey  used  to  impute  income  as  described  above  is  the  November  2003  CASEN, 
administered  by  the  University  of  Chile  on  behalf  of  the  MIDEPLAN.   The  survey  utilizes 
multistage random sampling with regional stratification and clustering.  In the first stage, the 
country is divided between rural and urban areas for each of the 13 regions, and the primary 
sampling units are selected according to a probability sample based on the 2002 census.  Within 
each sampling unit, households are selected with equal probability.
5  The data collected include 
income, ethnicity, household demographics, ownership of specific assets, and housing quality as 
well  as  other  measures  of  socioeconomic well-being.    The  Economic  Commission  for  Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) corrects these data for non-response and reporting errors 
and discrepancies.
6     9 
  The  2003  sample  covers  68,155  households  (Table  1),  including  4,940  households 
headed by ethnic Mapuche; 1,012 headed by the Aymará; 326 headed by the Atacameño; 59 
headed by the Quechua; 9 headed by the Rapanui; 19 headed by the Colla; 13 headed by the 
Kawashkar, and one Yagán household.  The CASEN is representative at the national level, at the 
level  of  each  region,  and for  all  urban  areas and all rural  areas  (Pizzolito  2005),  but is not 
representative by ethnicity.  As a result, as noted in the Introduction, using the CASEN alone to 
estimate poverty by ethnicity yields weak results given the magnitudes of the standard errors for 
some ethnic groups.   
The 2002 census collects data from 4,112,838 households comprising 15,545,921 people.  
Some 4.6% of all Chilean households are headed by indigenous peoples, 86% of which self-
identify as being Mapuche (Table 2).  Aymará-headed household comprise an additional 0.33% 
of the total number of households, while Atacameño-headed households comprise 0.16% and 
Quechua-headed households comprise 0.04%. Collectively, Rapanui-, Colla-, Kawashkar-, and 
Yagán-headed households comprise less than 0.10% of the total.  Headcount ratios are calculated 
according to the official poverty (indigence) lines: 43,712 (21,856) Chilean Pesos per capita in 
urban areas and 29,473 (16,842) Chilean Pesos per capita in rural areas (MIDEPLAN, 2005).  
These lines are based on the costs of a weighted average of basic daily requirements for food 





   10 
5. Results  
5.1 Poverty and Indigence Estimates  
The first stage estimates are presented in Appendix Table 1.  To summarize these results, all of 
the regressors are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level, all signs are as expected, 
and variation in the regressors jointly explains 54% of the variation in household income per 
capita,  a  high  value  for  cross-sectional  regression.    The  R-squared  statistics  for  individual 
regions range between 0.455 and 0.575, similar to those obtained Elbers et al. (2007) in studying 
spatial aspects of poverty for a variety of countries.   
Table 3 presents the estimated headcount ratio, poverty gap, and indigence rate (i.e., the 
headcount ratio using the indigence line) for each ethnic group using the methodology described 
in Section 3, with standard errors reported in parentheses.  The estimates are considerably more 
precise than those derived from the CASEN alone.   For example, the standard error for the 
headcount  ratio  for  Rapanui-headed  households  is  81%  lower  than  that  estimated  using  the 
CASEN alone, and the 90% confidence interval is smaller than ± 3.4% for each of the nine 
ethnic groups. The Mapuche and the Aymará have the highest estimated levels of both poverty 
and indigence while the point estimates for non-indigenous Chileans are the lowest of any ethnic 
group.   
These results indicate significant income stratification by ethnicity in Chile.  To see this 
more clearly, Figure 1 presents the headcount ratios and indigence rates together with the 90% 
confidence intervals.  Poverty rates for every indigenous group except the Yagán exceed the 
poverty rates for non-indigenous Chileans at the 90% confidence level.
7  This difference exceeds 
8.5 percentage points at the 90% confidence level for the two most impoverished groups, the 
Aymará and the Mapuche; that is, poverty rates among the Aymará and Mapuche are at least   11 
36% higher than those for the non-indigenous population.  Similarly, non-indigenous Chileans 
have a lower incidence of indigence at the 90% confidence level than the Mapuche, the Aymará, 
the Atacameño, the Quechua, and the Colla.  Indeed, the gap in indigence rates between non-
indigenous Chileans and the Aymará is at least 3.1 percentage points, i.e., poverty rates are 
approximately 63% higher for Aymará-headed households. 
In addition to facilitating comparison of each of Chile’s indigenous groups with the non-
indigenous population, these results also facilitate comparisons of poverty and indigence rates 
within indigenous communities.  With 90% confidence, Aymarás have higher poverty rates than 
any other ethnic group save Mapuches and Colla.  Aymarás also have higher indigence rates than 
Atacameños, Rapanuis, and Yagán peoples at the 90% confidence level.   
The estimated poverty gap ranges from 7.9% of aggregate household income for non-
indigenous Chileans to 12.4% of aggregate household income for the Aymará (Table 3).  At the 
90% confidence level, the poverty gap for non-indigenous Chileans is lower than that for any 
other ethnic group save the Yagán, while the poverty gap for the Aymará is higher than that for 
any other ethnic group except the Colla. 
  Given  disparities  in  access  to  economic  opportunities  across  Chile  (Soto  and  Torche 
2004;  Amuedo-Dorantes  2005),  variation  in  poverty  and  indigence  rates  may  derive  from 
geography rather than ethnicity.  For example, high headcount ratios among Aymará-headed 
households may reflect economic opportunities in Region I (where more than 82% of Aymarás 
reside) rather than economic opportunities for Aymará people per se.  To explore this possibility, 
Figure 2 compares poverty rates in households headed by Aymará, Atacameño, Quechua, Colla, 
Rapanui, and Mapuche individuals in Regions I, II, II, III, V, and IX, respectively, to poverty 
rates in non-indigenous households in those same regions.
8  The 90% confidence intervals are   12 
shown alongside the point estimates.  In Region I, the estimated headcount ratio for Aymarás is 
31.0%  compared  to  an  estimated  headcount  ratio  for  non-indigenous  people  of  18.7%,  a 
difference that is highly significant.  Indeed, the indigenous/non-indigenous headcount ratios are 
statistically different at the 90% confidence level for Quechuas in Region II, Rapanui in Region 
V, and Mapuche in Region IX (where over one-third of Mapuche households live below the 
poverty line), although there is no statistical difference in the headcount ratios for Atacameño 
and non-indigenous households in Region  II.   Indigence rates are statistically higher for the 
Aymará  than  for  non-indigenous  people  in  Region  I  and  for  the  Mapuche  than  for  non-
indigenous people in Region IX. 
  To further control for geographic variation in economic opportunity, we also compare 
headcount  ratios  and  indigence  rates  for  each  of  these  indigenous  groups  to  those  of  non-
indigenous households in the Santiago Metropolitan Region.  Santiago is a common destination 
among  migrants,  and  fully  28.7%  of  indigenous-headed  households  are  now  located  in  the 
capital.  Moreover, migration is accelerating, with nearly 8% of indigenous households (versus 
6% of non-indigenous households) arriving in the five years prior to the census.   
Poverty rates for the Aymará, the Rapanui, and the Mapuche population are lower in 
Santiago (at the 90% confidence level) than in their traditional residences of Region I, V, and IX, 
but the same cannot be said for the Atacameño and the Quechua.  Consistent with the notion that 
indigenous people have fewer economic opportunities regardless of where they live, poverty and 
indigence rates for the Mapuche in Santiago are higher than those of non-indigenous households.  
By  contrast,  poverty  rates  for  Aymará  households  are  lower  than  poverty  rates  for  non-
indigenous households, suggesting that high-ability and/or well-connected Aymarás have left 
Region  I  for  greener  pastures  in the  capital.
9    There is no  statistical difference (at the  90%   13 
confidence level) in the poverty and indigence rates between Atacameño, Quechua, and Rapanui 
households and non-indigenous households. 
 
5.2 Inequality Estimates and Decomposition 
Using the same methodology, we also estimate the Gini coefficient for each ethnic group. These 
estimates and their standard errors are presented in the last column of Table 3.  Inequality is 
highest  among  non-indigenous  households  and  Yagán  households,  with  Gini  coefficients  of 
approximately 0.52.  The Gini coefficient for non-indigenous households is higher at the 90% 
confidence level than that for any other ethnic  group  except the Quechua.  By  contrast, the 
Mapuche have an estimated Gini coefficient of 0.457, statistically lower than for any other group 
except  for  the  Kawashkar.    Therefore,  as  with  poverty,  there  exists  considerable  inequality 
stratification in Chile.  Figure 2 presents these estimated Gini coefficients together with 90% 
confidence intervals to more fully illustrate this point. 
In addition to evaluating inequality within each ethnic group, policy-makers may wish to 
understand how inequality between ethnic groups contributes to total inequality.  To decompose 
total  inequality  into  “between”  and  “within”  components,  we  apply  the  Pyatt  (1976)  Gini 
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Here,  B G  represents between-group inequality,  i b  is the product between the proportion of the 
population in subgroup i and the proportion of the total income earned by that group,  i G is the 
within-group inequality for group i, and R is the overlapping or crossover term. Between-group 
inequality arises in differences in mean incomes between groups.  The second term is simply the 
weighted sum of within-group Gini statistics.  The third term is somewhat more difficult to   14 
interpret:  according  to  Pyatt  (1976),  R  conveys  the  positive  expectation  of  gains  to  poorer 
members of a rich group who draw richer members of a poorer group as a result of random 
sampling.  Silber (1989) interprets this “overlap” term as the intensity of permutation that is 
caused by ranking individuals first by the income shares of their group and then by their income 
share within that group (as opposed to a ranking based on individual shares of the total income 
obtained by all the groups).  More simply, Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) interpret the cross-over 
term is an indicator of stratification among different population groups.   
Table 9 presents the results of the decomposition of the Gini Coefficient by ethnicity 
using the Pyatt (1976) method.  Within-group inequality explains 92.8% of total inequality while 
between-group inequality explains 2.8%.  This leaves 4.4% in the overlap category, indicative of 
considerable income stratification by ethnicity.  The small values for the between-group may be 
expected given the very small proportion of indigenous groups within the national population 
(Elbers et al. 2005).  However, Kanbur (2000) reports that even low levels of between-group 
inequality  may  put  social  stability  at  risk  if  persistent  inequities  exceed  some  “acceptable” 
threshold (which may be low in some countries).  For this reason, Elbers et al. (2005) propose a 
normalization of the between-group inequality ratio by the number and relative sizes of groups, 
thereby  generating  an  alternative  statistic  that  can  be  compared  across  different  settings, 
irrespective of the number of groups and the relative sizes involved.  
Simply put, the standard calculation of the fraction of between-group inequality is based 
on the ratio of between-group inequality to total inequality, yet total inequality may represent an 
extreme benchmark because it does not take into account the effect of the number and relative 
sizes  for  the  groups  involved.    The  alternative  benchmark  proposed  by  Elbers  et  al.  (2005) 
replaces total inequality in the standard calculation with the maximum between-group inequality   15 
(MBGI) that could be obtained if the number of groups and their sizes were restricted to be the 
same as those used to calculate between-group inequality.
10  The between-group inequality ratio 











where  b R' is the normalized ratio of between-group inequality and  b R  is the ratio of between-
group inequality to total inequality.  This measure of between-groups inequality takes the value 
of 0 if all groups are identical and 1 if none of the group distributions overlap. 
  Applying this normalization to the previous estimates provides a very different picture of 
inequality between ethnic groups in Chile.  As shown in the final row of Table 4, current levels 
of between-group inequality account for approximately 35% of the maximum between-group 
inequality  conceivable  given  the  relative sizes  of  the  ethnic  groups  and  the  national  income 
distribution.  This result places Chile among other  Latin American countries that are highly 
stratified ethnically, such as Guatemala and Peru.  Chile’s between-group inequality is higher 
than  that  reported  by  Elbers  et  al.  (2005)  for  Bolivia  (about  25%)  and  Brazil  (20%),  but 
somewhat lower than that of Panama (36.5%).   
In August 2007, President Bachelet appointed a panel of experts to design new public 
policies aimed at reducing income inequality in Chile.  Given the correlations between total 
inequality  and  between-group  inequality  demonstrated  above,  this  panel  would  do  well  to 
consider policies that address differences in economic opportunities among Chile’s ethnic groups 
as well as policies meant to target overall inequality.    
 
 
   16 
6. Conclusions 
Although  geographic  considerations  have  enhanced  efforts  to  target  poverty  in  recent  years, 
identifying  new  criteria  for  identifying  the  poor  may  further  strengthen  antipoverty  efforts 
(Bigman and Fofack 2000).  In Chile and other countries in which ethnicity has a strong impact 
on  income  and  welfare,  policy-makers  should  consider  including  ethnicity  in  their  targeting 
programs.  Given that most surveys that include measures of income are not representative by 
ethnicity, however, it is important to employ methods to reliably estimate poverty and inequality 
by ethnicity.  This is the first study to achieve this objective in practice.  
Applying  poverty  mapping  methods  to ethnicity  in  the  Chilean  context,  we  find  that 
poverty is particularly acute among the  Mapuche and the Aymará, with more than 30% the 
households  represented  by  these  groups  living  below  the  poverty  line.    Moreover,  with  the 
exception of  the  Kawashkar,  all  other  officially-recognized  indigenous  groups in  Chile  have 
higher rates of poverty than non-indigenous people (at the 90% confidence level), often much 
higher.  Indigence is also disproportionately felt by indigenous groups, especially the Aymará 
and Mapuche.  These same groups also experience greater depth of poverty as measured by the 
poverty gap. 
However, with the exception of the Yagán (which has so few members that deriving 
statistically precise figures is difficult), indigenous Chileans face lower income inequality than 
the non-indigenous population.  The Mapuche in particular stand out as Chile’s least unequal 
group.    Decomposing  total  inequality  into  “between”  and  “within”  components  reveals  that 
between-group  inequality  explains  a  very  small  part  of  total  inequality.    Still,  since  the 
indigenous population represents less than 5% of the total population, the fact that between-
group inequality accounts for less than 3% of overall inequality at the national level is perhaps   17 
not  surprising.    However,  normalizing  the  between-inequality  statistic  with  respect  to  the 
maximum between-inequality benchmark defined by Elbers et al. (2005) shows that between-
group  inequality  is  similar  to  other  Latin  American  countries  with  high  levels  of  income 
stratification by ethnicity. 
Headcount ratios and Gini coefficients based derived from matching survey and census data are 
more precise than those calculated directly from the CASEN, providing a more complete picture 
of poverty and inequality in Chile.  Moreover, applying poverty mapping methods to ethnicity 
enables  more  far-reaching  inquiry  into  the  presence  of  poverty  traps  and  the  persistence  of 
inequality in order to better inform public policy.  For example, future research may illuminate 
why the Atacameño are both wealthier and less equal than the Mapuche, on average.  At the 
same time, future research may investigate the relationship between poverty and migration and 
the  role  of  remittances  on  poverty  and  inequality  in  indigenous  communities.   18 
 Appendix 1 
This  Appendix  provides  a  brief  overview  of  the  methodology  proposed  by  Hentschel  et  al. 
(1999) and developed by Elbers et al. (2003).  In the first stage, we develop a model to relate the 
income per capita of household h (Yh) in ethnic group c:  
hc hc hc hc hc hc u X u X Y E Y + = + = b ] | [ln ln  
where  hc X  is a vector of the household characteristics, including household demographics (e.g. 
gender of the household head; education; household composition; and disabilities) ownership of 
specific assets (e.g. major appliances; television; water heater; and cellular telephone), housing 
quality (e.g. size of dwelling; construction material; and roofing material), and interaction terms.  
By assumption, the error vector u is distributed F(0,￿).  To allow for correlation within each 
cluster,  the  error  term  is  further  assumed  to  consist  of  a  cluster  component  (￿)  and  an 
idiosyncratic error (￿): 
hc c hc u e h + =  
The two components are assumed to be independent of each other and uncorrelated with the 
observable variables Xhc.  
  It is not necessary to specify a restrictive functional form to estimate the variance of the 
idiosyncratic component of the error,
2
e s . Indeed, with consistent estimators of ￿, the residuals of 
the decomposition of the estimated error, 
hc c c hc c hc u u u u e h ˆ ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ . . + = - + =    19 
can be used to estimate the variance of ￿.
11  The functional form commonly used for estimating 
























ˆ 2  
The upper and lower limits, A and B, can be estimated together with the parameter ￿ using a 
standard pseudo-maximum likelihood; the advantage of this approach is that impossible values 
for the predicted variances cannot be obtained. 
  The model is estimated using the data from the Casen survey. It is important to note that 
the cluster component of the residual can significantly reduce the power of the estimates in the 
second stage, and that it is thus important to explain the variation in income or consumption due 
to ethnicity via observable variables.  
  The  result  of  this  first-stage  estimation  is  a  vector  of  coefficients,  ￿,  a  variance-
covariance  matrix  associated  with  this  vector,  and  a  set  of  parameters  that  describe  the 
distribution  of  the  errors.    The  second  stage  utilizes  this  set  of  parameters  along  with  the 
characteristics  of  the  individuals  or  households  in  the  census  in  order  to  generate  predicted 
values of the log of income and the relevant errors.  For these effects, bootstrapping is used to 
simulate  values  of  household  income  per  capita  for  each  individual  in  the  census.  These 
simulated values are based on the prediction of the income and the error terms, ￿ and ￿: 
) ˆ ˆ ˆ exp( ˆ
hc c hc hc X Y e h b + + =  
  For each household, the two components of the error term are taken from the empirical 
distribution described by the parameters estimated in the first stage.  The coefficientsb ˆ  are taken   20 
from a normal multivariate distribution described by the estimators of ￿ in the first stage and the 
associated variance-covariance matrix.  The complete set of simulated values of  hc Y ˆ  is then used 
to  calculate  the  expected  value  of  poverty  or  inequality  measures  by  ethnic  group.    This 
procedure is repeated n times, taking a new set of coefficients ￿ and errors for each simulation; 
for each ethnic group, the mean and the standard deviation of the poverty indicator are calculated 
over the whole set of simulations, which constitute its point estimate and its standard deviation, 
respectively. 
  Let call the inequality indicator G(nc, Xc, ￿, uc), where nc is a Nc vector of the number of 
household members in ethnic group c, Xc is a Ncxk vector of their observable characteristics, and 
uc is a Nc error vector.  Thus, the expected value of the inequality indicator is estimated given the 
characteristics of the individuals and the households and the model estimated in the first stage, 
i.e.: 
[ ] x ; , | X n G E G
E
c =  
where  x  is the vector of parameters of the model, including the parameters that describe the 
distribution of the error term.  Replacing the unknown vectorx , with a consistent estimatorx ˆ, we 
get: 
[ ] x ˆ , , | X n G E G
E
c =  
This  conditional  expected  value  is  generally  impossible  to  resolve  analytically,  making  it 




.   21 
Calculating the correct standard errors for this model is non-trivial.  Because it is not 
possible  to  calculate  them  analytically,  the  methodology  again  resorts  to  bootstrapping 
techniques and Monte Carlo simulations.  Suppressing the subscripts, the difference between the 




, and the actual level of the inequality indicator for the 
geographic area can be decomposed into: 
)
~ ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ) (
~ E E E E E E G G G G G G G G - + - + - = -  
The prediction error thus has three components: the first is due to the presence of a stochastic 
error in the first stage model, implying that the actual household incomes deviate from their 
expected values (idiosyncratic error); the second is due to the variance in the estimators of the 
parameters of the model from the first stage (model error); and the third is due to the use of an 
inexact method to calculate  c G ˆ (computation error). 
  The variance of the estimator due to the idiosyncratic error shrinks proportionally with 
the population in each ethnic group.  Thus, smaller populations within each ethnic group are 
associated with larger idiosyncratic errors, introducing a limit to the extent of disaggregation that 
may be achieved.  The variance of the estimator due to the model error can be calculated using 
the delta method: 
Ñ Ñ = ) ˆ (x V V
T
Model  
where  [ ] x ¶ ¶ = Ñ /
E G ,  ( ) x V is the variance-covariance matrix of the first stage estimators, and 
x ˆis a consistent estimator of  x , also obtained from the first stage.  This component of the 
predicted errors is determined by the properties of the first-stage estimators and therefore doesn’t   22 
systematically change with the population in each ethnic group; its magnitude depends only on 
the precision of the first-stage estimates.  The variance of the estimator due to computational 
error  depends  on  the  computational  methodology  used.    Since  Monte  Carlo  simulations  are 
employed  here,  it  is  possible  to  reduce  this  error  component  by  increasing  the  number  of 
simulations;  we use  200  simulations  to  minimize  the  error  component  to the  greatest  extent 
possible. 
  The expected value of the inequality indicator coefficient is thus conditional on the first 
stage regression, the variance due to the idiosyncratic component of income per capita of the 
households, and the gradient vector.  The Monte Carlo simulation generates 200 vectors of error 
terms from the distribution estimated in the first stage. With each set of vectors, the inequality 
indicator is calculated.  Then, the expected value simulated for the inequality indicator is the 
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Appendix 2 
 
Table 1. First-Stage Estimates 
  Coefficient  Std. Err. 
Constant   11.5384  (0.0356) 
Internet   0.2394  (0.0113) 
Washing machine  0.1325  (0.0064) 
Water heater   0.1728  (0.0087) 
Cell phone  0.1123  (0.0092) 
Fixed phone  0.2482  (0.0294) 
Cable or Satellite TV   0.1698  (0.0081) 
Microwave  0.2529  (0.0286) 
Education of household head   0.0373  (0.0056) 
Electric energy - public system  -0.0952  (0.0247) 
Woman household head   -0.1655  (0.0144) 
Fraction of persons with disability in household  -0.2762  (0.0211) 
Fraction of children in household  -1.6785  (0.1080) 
Number of children  0.2226  (0.0237) 
Number of household members  -0.4035  (0.0066) 
Number of household members squared   0.0263  (0.0006) 
Zinc roof with interior ceiling   -0.1539  (0.0074) 
Zinc roof without interior ceiling   -0.2732  (0.0351) 
Number of rooms  0.1232  (0.0052) 
Urban household  0.1264  (0.0297) 
Brick walls  -0.0236  (0.0073) 
Thin covered walls  -0.0545  (0.0081) 
Hot water heater * Cell phone  0.0391  (0.0120) 
Cell phone * Computer  0.0495  (0.0139) 
Computer * Microwave * Fixed phone * Cell phone * Water 
heater * Cable or satellite TV  
0.0514  (0.0133) 
Education of household head squared   -0.0071  (0.0007) 
Education of household head * Head is female  -0.0055  (0.0013) 
Education of household head * Number of children   0.0266  (0.0024) 
Number of disabled members * Head is female  0.0587  (0.0140) 
Number of children * Head is female  0.0641  (0.0106) 
Urban household * Number of household members  -0.0173  (0.0046) 
Urban household * Number of rooms  -0.0223  (0.0055) 
Urban household * Fixed phone  -0.0826  (0.0300) 
Urban household * Microwave  -0.1137  (0.0293) 
Urban household * Computer   0.0565  (0.0120) 
Urban household * Electricity generator   -0.2565  (0.0571) 
Urban household * Pit latrine   0.1029  (0.0191) 
Education of household head cubed   0.0005  (0.0000) 
R-squared   0.5359   
R-squared adjusted   0.5357   
Observations   67,557   
Notes: 
All coefficients are significant at the 99% level 
  
1 Between 1987 and 2003, poverty rates in Chile fell from 45.1% to 18.8% (Contreras et al. 2001).    
2 Chile’s Gini coefficient of 0.546 has scarcely budged in the last two decades despite policies designed to redress 
income these disparities across regions, but not ethnicity (Ferreira and Litchfield 1999; Agostini and Brown 2007).   24 
3 In the 1992 Census the total indigenous population numbered about one million people, or 9.6% of Chile’s total 
population. Thus, the two censuses note a striking 30% decrease during 1992-2002. This figure may be partly 
explained by the wording of the question in the survey form from: “Do you consider yourself belonging to any of 
these cultures: Mapuche, Aymara, Rapa Nui, or none of the previous?” (1992) to “Do you belong to any of the 
following original or indigenous peoples: Alacaufe (Kawashkar), Atacameno, Aymara, Colla, Mapuche, Quechua, 
Rapa Nui, Yamana (Yagán), or none of the previous?” (2002) (Haughney 2006).  
4 At the time of the census, Chile was comprised of 13 regions, generally referred to by Roman numerals from north 
to south.  The only exception is the Santiago Metropolitan Region, sometimes referred to as Region XIII, which is 
located between Regions V and VI.  
5 Further methodological details are provided by Pizzolito (2005). 
6 In the case of non-response, the average value of the income group to which the household belongs according to 
the intersection of several criteria (region, gender of household head, education, employment, etc.) is imputed to 
replace the missing value. In the case of under- or over- reporting of income, the Household Income and 
Expenditures Accounts System of the Central Bank of Chile is used as a reference for adjusting income categories 
for each individual surveyed in the CASEN, on the key assumption that misreporting differs across income 
categories and not income levels.   For additional details, refer to ECLAC, IPEA, and INDP (2002).  Although these 
adjustments may theoretically bias our estimates, Contreras (2003) argues that any bias introduced in this way is 
minimal. 
7 Indeed, the difference in poverty rates between indigenous and non-indigenous groups is statistically significant at 
the 99% confidence level for each ethnic group except the Rapanui and Yagán.  
8 Kawashkar and Yagán households are not included given the very small number of observations in any one region 
and the fact that these ethnic groups are not concentrated in any one region.  
9 Interestingly, the incidence of poverty among individual indigenous groups is no different (at the 90% confidence 
level) for households that migrated between 1997 and 2002 than for those that migrated prior to 1997, suggesting 
that social networks in Santiago are of limited insurance against poverty.  By contrast, the incidence of poverty is 
statistically lower among recent non-indigenous migrants. 
10MBGI is determined by reallocating incomes among groups while maintaining the overall distribution according to 
the following procedure: the group with the lowest income mean is assigned the average mean of the lowest 
percentile in the national distribution corresponding to its size.  The next group in the ascending order of mean 
incomes is then assigned the average of the next corresponding percentile of the population in the overall income 
distribution.  This process is repeated for each remaining group, and the resulting distribution generates the MBGI 
statistic. 
11 The subindex “.” in the equation represents the average over the index.   25 
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Figure 2. Poverty and Indigence Rates by Ethnicity in Home Regions and Santiago 
 
A. Mapuche                                                                    B.  Aymará 
C. Atacameño                                                                  D.  Quechua 
C.  Rapanui                                                                        D.  Colla 
         Region 9                    Santiago             Region 1                    Santiago  
         Region 2                     Santiago                                      Region 2                    Santiago 
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Table 1. Headcount Ratio by Ethnicity from the 2003 CASEN Survey 
 
   Observations 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Non-indigenous   61,774  [17.41%, 18.69%] 
     
Mapuche  4,940  [1.76%, 59.94%] 
     
Aymará  1,012  [11.23%, 38.66%] 
     
Atacameño  326  [-15.83%, 26.49%] 
     
Quechua  59  [-0.59%, 28.64%] 
     
Rapanui  9  [2.91%, 62.20%] 
     
Colla  19  [-1.58%, 31.13%] 
     
Kawashkar  13  [7.90%, 73.87%] 
     
Yagán  3  n/a 
     



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































s  33 










Non-indigenous   23.5%  7.9%  5.9%  0.522 
  (0.0030)  (0.0016)  (0.0020)  (0.0042) 
Mapuche  33.1%  11.5%  9.9%  0.457 
  (0.0037)  (0.0022)  (0.0031)  (0.0028) 
Aymará  33.9%  12.4%  10.6%  0.492 
  (0.0056)  (0.0029)  (0.0040)  (0.0054) 
Atacameño  28.6%  10.0%  8.0%  0.488 
  (0.0070)  (0.0033)  (0.0047)  (0.0077) 
Quechua  30.8%  10.9%  8.9%  0.498 
  (0.0122)  (0.0054)  (0.0079)  (0.0105) 
Rapanui  27.5%  9.5%  7.3%  0.485 
  (0.0140)  (0.0064)  (0.0096)  (0.0121) 
Colla  31.2%  11.2%  9.0%  0.490 
  (0.0145)  (0.0060)  (0.0100)  (0.0120) 
Kawashkar  29.1%  9.9%  7.7%  0.481 
  (0.0176)  (0.0080)  (0.0117)  (0.0143) 
Yagán  27.0%  9.4%  7.3%  0.524 
  (0.0204)  (0.0085)  (0.0136)  (0.0193) 
Notes: 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses   34 
Table 4. Decomposition of Total Inequality by Ethnicity 
 
    National 
   
Index    Percentage 
Total  0.526  100.0% 
Within   0.488  92.8% 
Overlap   0.023  4.4% 
Pyatt Decomposition 
Between  0.015  2.8% 
MBGI   0.043     Normalization 
Rb'=Between/MBGI     34.9% 
Notes:  
Pyatt decomposition in Stata using household incomes inputed in the 2003 Census with PovMap 2.0   
Normalization in Stata following Elbers et al. (2005) 
 
 
 
 